The activity of the mind -- and it's the fourth paragraph-now is not to bring things together, doing search all that they can be discovered in terms of of kinship, attraction, or hidden way split of nature, but rather to discern: that is, to establish identities, then the need to move to all degrees of remove from them. In this sense, a consistent distinction obliges compared to the original search and the fundamental differences; through intuition to give yourself a clear idea o things clearly and fix the transition from one element of the series to the other, immediately following the him. And finally, the last result so as to know means to distinguish science and history are separated from one other. On the one hand, we have the knowledge, reading authors, their opinions; the latter can sometimes be of value instructions, but not so much due to the consent, which is here is the number thanks to the controversy: "when it o is a difficult question, it is more likely that in the right the solution to converge not many". On the other hand, this history opposed to a reliable judgment, having with her nothing to do; we can formulate them by means of intuitions and their clutch, and these judgments do not have General measures the above story. Judgment, and only judgment, constitute science, and even if we "read all the arguments of Plato and Aristotle
ReplyDeleteThe activity of the mind -- and it's the fourth paragraph-now
is not to bring things together, doing
search all that they can be discovered in terms of
of kinship, attraction, or hidden way split
of nature, but rather to discern: that is,
to establish identities, then the need to move to all
degrees of remove from them.
In this sense, a consistent distinction obliges
compared to the original search and the fundamental differences;
through intuition to give yourself a clear idea o
things clearly and fix the transition from
one element of the series to the other, immediately following the
him. And finally, the last result so as to know means
to distinguish science and history are separated from one
other. On the one hand, we have the knowledge, reading
authors, their opinions; the latter can sometimes be of value
instructions, but not so much due to the consent, which is here
is the number thanks to the controversy: "when it
o is a difficult question, it is more likely that in the right
the solution to converge not many". On the other hand, this
history opposed to a reliable judgment, having with her
nothing to do; we can formulate them by means of intuitions
and their clutch, and these judgments do not have General measures
the above story. Judgment, and only judgment,
constitute science, and even if we "read all
the arguments of Plato and Aristotle