From here two consequence. First, negative-purely of a historical nature. It may seem that phenomenology tied together the theme of the Cartesian cogito with the transcendental subject, which Kant learned from Hume's criticism; in this case, none other as Husserl would have breathed new life into the deep calling the Western mind, closing it on himself reflection, serving as a radicalization of pure philosophy and a feasibility study of its own history. In fact Husserl was able to effect this Union only in so far due to a change in the point of application of transcendental analysis (with the possibility of the science of nature to the possibility for a person to conceive of oneself) and as also changed the function cogito (and it is not to show how thought that asserts itself wherever it thinks, should lead to apodictical existence, but to show how the idea, on the contrary, can escape from itself and to lead to versatile and diverse questioning of being). Phenomenology, thus, is not so much recovery the previous target of Western intelligence, how sensitive, exactly formulated the recognition of a gap that occurred in the modern episteme at the turn of XVIII and XIX centuries. If it is something connected at all, it is the discovery of life, work and language; this is a new image, which is the old name of the man there only some two centuries ago; it is a query about the way of being of man and his relation to the inconceivable. That's why phenomenology -- even if it initially has been just on the background of antipsychologism or, more precisely, because it is contrary to it revived the problem of aprioristic and the theme of transcendence, -- could never protect yourself from the hidden kinship -- location, simultaneously tempting and threatening-with empirical studies of the person; therefore, declaring that all be reduced to the cogito, the phenomenology has always led to the issues of ontology, an ontological issue as such. And we see how the phenomenological project always comes down to the description of feelings, which, in spite of everything, remains empirical and ontology unthinkable that off the primacy of the "I think."
From here two consequence. First, negative-purely
ReplyDeleteof a historical nature. It may seem that phenomenology
tied together the theme of the Cartesian cogito with the transcendental subject,
which Kant learned from Hume's criticism; in this case, none other
as Husserl would have breathed new life into the deep
calling the Western mind, closing it on himself
reflection, serving as a radicalization of pure philosophy and
a feasibility study of its own history. In fact
Husserl was able to effect this Union only in so far
due to a change in the point of application of transcendental analysis
(with the possibility of the science of nature to the possibility for a person
to conceive of oneself) and as also changed the function
cogito (and it is not to show how thought that
asserts itself wherever it thinks, should lead to
apodictical existence, but to show how
the idea, on the contrary, can escape from itself and to lead to
versatile and diverse questioning of being).
Phenomenology, thus, is not so much recovery
the previous target of Western intelligence, how sensitive, exactly
formulated the recognition of a gap that
occurred in the modern episteme at the turn of XVIII and XIX centuries.
If it is something connected at all, it is the discovery of life, work and
language; this is a new image, which is the old name of the man there
only some two centuries ago; it is a query about the way of being
of man and his relation to the inconceivable. That's why
phenomenology -- even if it initially has been just on
the background of antipsychologism or, more precisely, because it is contrary to it
revived the problem of aprioristic and the theme of transcendence, --
could never protect yourself from the hidden kinship --
location, simultaneously tempting and threatening-with
empirical studies of the person; therefore, declaring
that all be reduced to the cogito, the phenomenology has always led to
the issues of ontology, an ontological issue as such. And we
see how the phenomenological project always comes down to
the description of feelings, which, in spite of everything, remains
empirical and ontology unthinkable that off
the primacy of the "I think."